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Abstract 
A top management change represents a major event in the history of any company. 
Literature provides ample evidence on the relation between CEO turnovers and stock 
prices reactions. Overall, the aim of this dissertation is to study the Portuguese stock 
market reaction to CEOs turnover announcements. Particularly, we aim to comprehend 
the shareholder evaluation regarding the content of new released information of such 
announcements. We analyse average cumulative abnormal stock returns over a window 
of 11 days across CEO turnover announcements in Portuguese listed companies. We 
constructed a sample of 39 clean turnovers for the years 2002-2012 which was 
segmented according to CEOs departure type and succession origin. This dissertation 
contributes to the existing literature by supporting this subject with a new data sample, 
the Portuguese market. Generally, results suggest that CEO turnover announcements are 
value decreasing for stockholders, which reverses findings of studies from major 
markets like the US. Nonetheless, we find that PSI 20 investors view forced departures 
and internal successions as good news, since these turnovers yield average CARs of 
0,552 and 0,803 from days 1 to 5 of our event window.  
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1. Introduction  
The performance of a firm is influenced by several factors, and the nature of 
those factors could be either internal or external. Focusing on the internal factors, an 
important part is represented by the strategy designed for the company. Ultimately top 
executives with leadership roles largely influence the firm´s strategy, design, 
performance and corporate culture (Rhim et al, 2006). 
According to Bonnier and Brunner (1988), the title of Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) is a proxy of a senior management position of power and influence. For 
Reinganum (1985), a CEO possesses a disproportionate share of influence and power. 
These descriptions make possible for CEOs to affect organizational characteristics and 
promote change (Schwartz and Menon, 1985). Hence, the CEO plays a critical role, 
acting as the ultimate manager with responsibilities to match the firm´s performance 
needs (Furtado and Karan, 1990).  
Given the importance of the CEO function and the influence the position 
exercises on a company´s performance, the replacement of such manager has extreme 
importance on an organization´s life. The existing literature on the importance of a CEO 
turnover event on the life of a company is extensive: for Furtado and Karan (1990) a 
management turnover represents a major occurrence for the firm, as it may imply 
changes in subsequent performance and direction, and for Shen and Canella (2003) the 
CEO succession implies a leadership transition, which is of central importance for 
strategic management. New executive managers alter the organization's strategy, 
structures, and internal processes, which can impact subsequent firm performance 
(Daily and Dalton, 1995). For Rhim et al (2006), a CEO turnover will influence the 
power of organizational members and the allocation of organizational resources, thus 
representing a critical event.  
It is commonly established in finance theory that the maximization of the 
shareholders wealth is, or should be, the ultimate goal for a CEO and Board of Directors 
(BoD). As per previous paragraphs, it is understandable that to ensure an organization 
meets its goals, CEOs, acting as executive players, take management and strategic 
decisions, decisions that are sensitive and will affect a company future cash flows, and, 
consequently, shareholders wealth. In the context of the previous paragraph, where the 
importance of a CEO turnover was exhibited, it is crucial to understand that if the Board 
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of Directors has the power for taking the strategic decision of replacing a CEO, no 
matter the reason for it, then that decision should be taken under the old maxim of 
maximization of shareholders wealth. Furtado and Karan (1990) suggest that the Board 
of Directors is a guardian of the shareholders wealth, which assumes that the BoD acts 
(appoints, dismisses, reshuffles, etc…) in the interest of shareholders. For Huson, 
Parrino and Starks (2001), the decision of replacing a CEO is the most important made 
by a BoD.  
 The first studies on this subject of management turnover events are dated from the 
1980s. Over the last three decades numerous authors studied this theme. These authors 
analysed stock market reactions for management turnover events with different 
approaches: BoD characteristics, firm characteristics, turnover characteristics, etc… 
 An important thing to retain is that the great majority of researches were due for the 
United States (US) stock market, although we also find a relevant number of studies for 
the United Kingdom (UK) stock market and some single studies for small European 
countries and worldwide developing countries. No research has been found for the 
Portuguese stock market context and that is the main relevance behind this dissertation.  
 As per previous section, CEOs take management and strategic decisions, decisions 
that are sensitive and will affect a company future cash flows, and, consequently, 
shareholders wealth. According to figure 1, the PSI 20 index points evolution over the 
last decade shows us two different periods: one period (2002-2007) characterized by 
large increases of value for companies (shareholders) followed by a period (2008-2012) 
where companies (shareholders) lose value year after year. This research is also relevant 
to analyse the perception of investors on the influence that CEOs have to increase 
and/or destroy value for shareholders according to stock market trends.  
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Figure 1: PSI20 Index point evolution 
 
Figure 1 
Source: Datastream 
 
The existing literature widely agreed on the importance of a CEO turnover event 
on the life of a company. The occurrence of such event is expected to have influence on 
the future value of a company, due to different strategic policies that may arise with the 
coming of a new executive. In line with current and past literature, we also believe on 
the importance of a CEO turnover event. 
Additionally, we will contribute to the existing literature with a new hand 
collected data sample, possibly corroborating previous findings on US markets.  
 The drive of this dissertation is to observe the effect on stock prices of a CEO 
turnover event in the Portuguese stock market context.  
 Our research questions are in line with the hypothesis placed on other studies on 
CEO turnover. Accordingly, this dissertation will investigate the following issues:  
§ The effect on stock prices of a CEO turnover around the announcement date; 
§ The effect on stock prices considering the CEO succession specification of 
internal versus external appointment; 
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§ The effect on stock prices considering the CEO departure specification of 
forced versus voluntary leaving. 
 This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Following this introduction, the next 
chapter reviews the existing literature on CEO turnovers, widely covering the topic, 
since the reasons behind turnovers, the way to measure the effect turnovers and the 
stock market reaction to such events, duly segmented in departure type and successor 
origin. 
 In chapter 3 we point out our research methodology. We explain how we build our 
sample, since there was no useful database for this subject, followed by a description on 
how we proceeded to categorize turnovers according to specific characteristics and 
some descriptive statistic as well. Last but not least, the most important section in this 
chapter is the detailed explanation of the test statistics we use to perform this event 
study. 
 In chapter 4 we analyse and discuss empirical results of test statistics. We present 
results for market reaction as a whole, for market reaction according to departure type 
and to successor origin and for a crossing characteristics analysis. 
 Finally, in chapter 5 we summary the major results and design conclusions from 
them.   
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter briefly approached the importance of a CEO turnover 
event for the (future) performance of a company. Supported with assertions from a few 
number of authors whom researched on the theme, we have designed a line of thought, 
where firstly we presumed that leadership positions exercises enough influence to 
conduct strategic decisions, followed by considering a Chief Executive Officer as a 
proxy for senior management (and consequently, a leadership position). Therefore, we 
have considered a CEO as a critical role within the company, once the turnover of this 
position is a major event on the life of an organization.     
In this chapter we will proceed with the literature review about CEO turnover 
events, by examining the extent to which this event has been studied and the findings of 
these previous studies.  
We will start by revising the reasons provided by the existing literature for the 
occurrence of a CEO turnover, where the prior poor performance of the firm represents 
an important stake. In last resort, it is possible to classify turnover announcements in 
routine and non-routine procedures (Setiawan, 2008), but as we will see, literature 
provides us with different and additional reasons. 
In subsection 2.3 we review the major strands in literature for measuring the 
effect of CEO turnovers in the wealth of shareholders. Although some of the studies 
presented used accounting measures and additionally or not, stock prices, in general the 
researches on this literature review used capital market data as a proxy for measuring 
firm performance and shareholders wealth.  
In subsection 2.4 we analyse the stock market reaction to announcements of 
turnover events, where we divided the studies between the ones who find positive 
market reaction for the occurrence of such events, the authors who find negative market 
reaction, the authors who find different stock market reactions according to the 
specification of their studies and the ones who find statistically insignificant reaction. 
We further analyse the findings from the existing literature according to the 
CEO turnover specifications. In subsection 2.5 we review the findings of previous 
studies considering the manager departure type. Concerning departures, the existing 
literature focuses on a simpler way to observe it: forced versus voluntary. A forced 
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departure stands for the leaving of a CEO against his will. In the opposite way, a 
voluntary departure symbolizes the initiative of a CEO on leaving a firm. 
In subsection 2.6 of this chapter we review the findings of the existing literature 
according to the turnover specification of CEO succession. The great majority of the 
authors analysed in this chapter studied the market reactions for the appointment of a 
successor whether the new Chief Executive Officer or top manager was already in the 
firm or came from other organization. In this section, the literature debates the market 
reactions to external versus internal appointments. 
We will conclude this chapter with a critical analysis on the existing literature 
review for CEO turnover events. 
 
2.2. Reasons behind a CEO turnover event 
In this section we will emphasis in what past literature defined as possible causes 
for the event of CEO turnover. 
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) present four categories of departures for the previous 
CEO: retirement, resignation, death and dismissal. Warner et al (1988) reports that 
retirement is the most common reason stated for a CEO departure, but these authors, 
along with stating that in the majority of cases press releases tell us nothing about the 
reason behind the turnover, also indicate additional key motives for departure detailed 
in Wall Street Journal (WSJ) articles: assuming position in other firms, control change, 
poor performance, health and policy differences are the most significant. Weisbach 
(1988) also used WSJ as source, and suggest normal succession procedures as a motive. 
Denis and Denis (1995) find that retirement, followed by forced resignation, are the 
most common stated reasons for CEO turnovers. 
Adam and Mansi (2009) and Rim et al (2006) signal that poor prior performance 
may produce a turnover. Cools and Van Praag (2007) examined whether departure of a 
CEO was preceded by declines in operating and stock performance, suggesting effective 
monitoring and control. Studying the Japanese market, Kang and Shivdasani (1996) also 
find prior performance of the company before a turnover announcement. Dahya, Lonie 
and Power (1998) suggest that the BoD may feel obligated to remove the CEO in an 
effort to reverse a declining trend in profits and share price.  
 7 
 
Denis and Denis (1995) argue that CEO turnover events may be also related with 
firm investing and financing policies. 
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) focused their analysis on US firms that filed for 
“Chapter 11” (bankruptcy) and the extent to which managers are to blame when their 
firms become bankrupt. The authors find that managers from distressed firms tend to 
take similar actions of managers from wealthy firms, suggesting that managers that are 
blamed for financial distress are in fact serving as scapegoats. 
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) suggest that the normal procedure is for firms to 
disguise the true reason for appointing a new CEO. Weisbach (1988) suggests that 
companies do not announce the true reason behind CEO resignations. 
Shen and Canella (2003) reinforced the idea that the motive behind CEO 
turnover is important, but the succession planning is an issue of equal importance, 
because the new CEO determines the firm’s future strategic direction and performance. 
For that reason, on a further section this literature review will focus on effects of 
internal succession and external succession. 
Additional, health or legal problems could also be at the origin of a CEO 
turnover (Rim, Peluchette and Song, 2006).  
Almost all the reasons above stated are subsequent to a classification for CEO 
turnovers of routine or non-routine changes (Setiawan, 2008; Rim et al, 2006; Denis and 
Denis, 1995; Worrell, Davidson and Glascock, 1993).  
 
2.3. Measuring the effect of a CEO turnover event 
Measuring the impact of an event such a turnover announcement highlights the 
importance of the concept measure firm performance. Furtado and Karan (1990) 
suggest the change in the management team should therefore be of great interest to the 
primary stakeholders i.e., the shareholders.  
The large majority of previous researches on CEO turnover events measure firm 
performance through stock prices. Some studies use, along with capital market prices, 
accounting measures. Weisbach (1988) and Daily and Dalton (1995) are two examples 
of using both measures set for performance measures.  
Beatty and Zajac (1987) enumerate some advantages of using stock prices as 
firm performance to measure the effect of CEO turnover announcements. According to 
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these authors, there are two main advantages of using the stock market reactions. One is 
due to cross-sectional responses that may be considerer genuine perceptions from the 
investors relatively to the future performance of the firm. A second advantage is that it 
allows daily perceptions. Reinganum (1985) states that using capital market data, the 
anticipated effect of long-run changes in corporate performance can be measured on a 
short-term window, by using the event study methodology.  
 
2.4. The stock market reaction at the date of the announcement of CEO turnover. 
Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) hypothesized that the abnormal stock price 
effect at announcements of such events is, in fact, the sum of two effects: (1) a negative 
information effect, which reflects the reaction to previous performance, and (2) a 
positive real effect, which reflects the perception for shareholders interest. Bonnier and 
Brunner (1988) used a sample of distressed firms in order to minimize the information 
effect of the abnormal stock returns and instead focus on the real effect. These two 
studies are dated from the decade when first CEO turnovers researches appeared and 
still are a reference for subsequent studies, and, within the hypothesis of the two effects, 
one conviction: if the real effect is nominally higher than the information effect, then 
the net effect will induce positive abnormal returns. 
In the following four paragraphs, the first one review studies that find positive 
market reaction, the second paragraph review studies that find negative market reaction 
and the third paragraph review researches of authors that arrive to different conclusions 
due to turnover specifications and the fourth paragraph review studies that arrive to 
inconclusive or statistically insignificant results.    
Adam and Mansi (2009) research on the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on bondholder’s wealth, stockholder’s wealth, and changes in firm value. 
The authors find a CEO turnover beneficial for shareholders but damaging for 
bondholders, where the authors suggest that a CEO turnover represents a wealth transfer 
from bondholders to shareholders. Dahya and McConnell (2005) find, on average, an 
excess stock return around CEO turnover announcements. Thus, the authors extent their 
study to the presence of outside directors present on the BoD, finding that investors tend 
to see as good news the increasing number of outside directors in this organ. Dahya, 
Lonie and Power (1998) studied the turnover effects on large UK firms where 
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executives own more than 1% of the firm´s share and find that share price reaction to an 
unexpected management change is positive and significant. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) 
also find highly significant abnormal returns on the average two-days announcement 
period, as well as Kang and Shivdasani, who provide evidence turnover announcements 
of top managers in Japan result in statistically significant wealth increases. Setiawan 
(2008) also finds positive market reaction on the Indonesian context for CEO turnover 
announcements, suggesting that this event has content for investors, uncovering one 
negative reaction for particular contextual factor. 
Dedman and Lin (2002) examine the CEO departure announcements for UK 
based firms and find, in general, a negative market reaction. The authors also find that 
the announcements tend to be released together with other news related with the 
company, and their suggestion is that it may be to covering the potentially bad news 
about CEO replacement. When CEO departure announcements occur with a 
simultaneous release of a replacement announcement, market reaction tends to be null. 
Beatty and Zajac (1987) finds that there is a strong market reaction to the announcement 
of CEO changes that tends, on average to yield negatively the market value of large 
firms on the post-announcement period.  Khanna and Poulsen (1995) provide evidence 
concerning the extent to which managers are to blame in firms that become bankrupt 
and find that the stock market doesn´t respond positively, supporting the idea that 
financial distress is due to conditions that are not in control for a CEO.   
Reinganum (1985) provided evidence on stock market reaction according to the 
following three variables: the size of the firm, the origin of the successor (internal 
versus external) and the disposition of the predecessor. The author suggests that it may 
be incorrect to make simple generalizations about the effects find, once positive or null 
reactions were due to the combination of the three variables. Shen and Canella (2003) 
also find different results for stock market reaction consonant the characteristics of the 
turnover event, suggesting both the reason for the turnover and the succession planning 
of it are important considerations for investors. Neumann and Voetmann (2005) find 
positive stock price reaction around the announcement day when the motive is a layoff 
and negative stock price reaction when the motive is a voluntary exit, but also find that 
the cumulative abnormal returns weren´t statistically significant. Worrell, Davidson and 
Glascock (1993) provide evidence on stock market reaction to departure and succession 
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appointments where previous manager was fired and find that the response from 
investors is influenced by the turnover specifications, especially for the succession 
appointment.   
Cools and Van Praag (2007) find that the average abnormal return on the stock 
market around the announcement of an executive's departure is insignificant. Warner et 
al (1988) find no evidence on average abnormal returns for daily performance around 
the announcement date.  
 
2.5. Stock market reaction for forced versus voluntary CEO departure 
In this subsection we review the existing literature on stock market reaction 
according to a departure specification for CEO turnovers of forced departure, where the 
CEO is replaced due to a board of directors decision, and voluntary departure, where the 
CEO leaves the firm by his will. 
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) is one of the first studies providing evidence on CEO 
turnovers. This study focuses on the succession type and provides little evidence on 
dismissals. The authors name four general categories of a CEO departure – retirement, 
resignation, death and dismissal – but provide evidence on the impact on stock market 
only for the category of dismissals, finding it good news for shareholders once when it 
occurs, it is associated with stock price increases. Worrell, Davidson and Glascock 
(1993) studied the forced departure of key executives and also find positive market 
reactions to dismissals. Providing content from the Japanese stock market, Kang and 
Shivdasani (1996) also find that returns are greater when the CEO turnover is forced, 
when comparing normal succession turnovers. Adams and Mansi (2008) find that 
forced CEO turnover events tend to produce positive effects on shareholders wealth. 
Prior (poor) firm performance may be a cause for a CEO turnover (Warner, 
Watts and Wruck, 1988), and Weishback (1988) provide evidence that there is a 
stronger connection between past performance and the turnover probability for 
companies with boards dominated by outside directors. The author suggests that the 
market perceive that an outside-dominated board of directors, seen as a monitoring role, 
takes better decisions, thus increase value for shareholders when dismissing a CEO who 
had a bad performance. Denis and Denis (1995) document that forced resignations of 
top managers are preceded by large and significant declines in operating performance 
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and followed by large improvements in performance, which the author suggests with the 
effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms.  
Neumann and Voetmann (2005) provide evidence from the Danish stock market 
and also find that poor prior performance increases the probability of management 
replacements. Also, forced turnovers are value increasing for shareholders. the authors 
find, by the opposite, that the market tend to yield negatively a voluntary CEO 
departure. 
The existing literature also provides some evidence on the influence of a firm´s 
ownership structure in the stock market reaction to CEO turnovers (Dahya, Lonie and 
Power, 1998). The authors approach how the extent to which executives own shares in 
their own firms significantly affects the likelihood that they will be dismissed, finding 
that the probability of a forced departure was positively correlated with the levels of 
institutional share ownership in the firm. Although a forced departure of a CEO who has 
an equity stake in his own firm may be unusual departure, the authors find that the 
market positively yields that event. 
Hillier and McColgan (2005) studied CEO turnovers in family-run companies, 
finding that market react favourably when the departure of a family-CEO is announced, 
but only when these top managers are replaced by a non-family successor. The authors 
also find that following the departure of a family CEO, operating performance tends to 
increase, which is not the case for non-family managed companies. 
Along with the analysis of stock market reaction through price effects and prior 
performance, Cools and Van Praag (2007) added the analysis of the trading volumes at 
turnover announcements to their study. Following previous studies, the authors find a 
positive stock market reaction to forced turnover announcements. The authors suggest 
that investors value the internal monitoring mechanisms of the supervisory board 
dismissals decisions of badly performing managers are consistent shareholders wealth 
maximization. 
As mentioned in previous section, Setiawan (2008) combined routine vs. non-
routine (which may be defined as a proxy for forced vs. voluntary departure) with 
internal vs. external appointment. The author finds that the market reacts to all routine 
(voluntary) CEO turnover announcements, independently of the appointment 
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characteristic. Regarding non-routine changes (forced), Setiawan (2008) find that the 
market gives mixed signals.  
Unlike above researches mentioned above, Dedman and Lin (2002) find a 
negative reaction from UK stock markets to announcements of top executive departures, 
especially when the CEO is dismissed. These findings are contrary to the great majority 
of previous studies. The authors suggest that the market is anticipating succession 
problems. 
The findings from existing literature reviewed in this subsection clearly suggest 
that stock market tends to yield positively and more significantly forced turnovers 
departures. Over time, the frequency of forced turnover departures has increased 
(Huson, Parrino and Starks, 2001). 
 
2.6. Stock market reaction for internal versus external CEO succession 
The succession specification of a turnover event regards the origin of the new 
appointed CEO. The selection of the new top executive may derive from an internal 
market for executives, within the company, or resort to external labor market for 
executives, appointing an outside CEO (Furtado and Rozeff, 1987). 
Empirically, there is evidence that when it´s time to appoint a new CEO, the 
internal succession is clearly preferred. Lazear and Rosen (1981) say that this is due to a 
preference for promotion as an incentive system. In fact, in the majority of studies, the 
percentage of internal succession is way higher than external one. 
Reinganum (1985) finds positive performance of stock prices after external 
succession, but the abnormal returns are more significant on smaller firms than on 
larger firms, suggesting that leadership influence is constrained in larger firms and that 
with an external succession the board of directors wants to signal a favourable change. 
The size of the firm, large or small, may influence investor’s perception for the 
appointment of a successor. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) find that the stock market 
reaction is positive in both internal and external appointments, but in large firms 
internal appointments are more appreciated. Their suggestion is that internal 
appointments may prove the quality and validity of a firm’s investment policy in human 
specific capital.  
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Worrell, Davidson and Glascock (1993) studied stock market reaction to 
departures originated by key executives firing. These authors find positive market 
reactions when a permanent successor is appointed. Within the successor 
announcement, outside appointments were positively yielded by the market, while 
internal appointments suggested a wait and see reaction. 
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) provide evidence that turnover announcements in 
the Japanese market are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. The 
stock-price effects are also significantly positive when the successor is appointed from 
outside the firm.  
Dahya and McConnel (2005) investigated whether an increase on the number of 
outside directors on a UK firm board composition would influence the decision of 
appointing an external CEO. The authors find positive correlation between the number 
of external directors and the likelihood of appointing an external CEO. Additionally, 
they find that positive abnormal returns in the surroundings of the turnover 
announcement, where they suggest that investors appear to view appointments of 
outside CEOs as good news. 
Adams and Mansi (2009) studied the impact for shareholders and bondholders 
due to CEO turnover events, and the results the author obtained suggest the market 
reacts positively to both type of appointments, but tends to yield more significantly 
external appointments. Although focused on stock market reaction only, Shen and 
Canella (2003) find similar results for succession: An outside CEO appointments tends 
to be positively yielded by the market and, in the reverser way, an internal CEO 
appointment implies a negative reaction from investors. 
Setiawan (2008) show that the Indonesian market reacts to turnover 
announcements, dividing the analysis between routine and non-routine turnovers. 
Regarding routine announcements, the author find that the market reacts positively to 
internal appointments, and, by the opposite, reacts negatively to external appointments. 
When it comes to non-routine turnovers, the author finds that both internal and external 
appointments, the market gives a mixed reaction. The author suggests that theses results 
confirm Warner, Watts and Wruck (1998), where these authors argued the market tend 
to perceived mixed signals from a CEO turnover event. 
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Beatty and Zajac (1987) find the stock market yield negatively both internal and 
external appointments. Although, the authors conclude that the strategic value that 
companies attribute to CEO turnovers events in order to enhance shareholders wealth is 
increasing.  
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) provide evidence on the extent on CEO turnover of 
financially distressed firms. These authors find that (1) managers of bankrupt firms tend 
to take similar decisions of managers in control firms and (2) that the market does not 
respond positively to internal or external turnovers on these firms, which supports the 
idea that actual managers of firms that eventually will file for bankruptcy are serving as 
scapegoats. 
Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) studied the evolution of internal and external 
monitoring mechanisms over time and find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has 
changed over time and the frequencies of outside succession increased. 
The findings from existing literature reviewed in this subsection suggest external 
succession seems to yield higher positive abnormal returns. Although, results from 
several authors give us mixed signals regarding stock market reaction to outside vs. 
inside succession.  Also, while outside succession is increasing (Huson et al, 2001), in 
absolute terms internal succession seems to be the board of directors preferred choice. 
 
2.7. Critical analysis on the literature review 
The existing literature reviewed in this chapter is, in first place, geographically 
concentrated.  As it is possible to see on appendix A, most of the researches undertaken 
are on the US stock market. The American indexes are the largest in the world, so 
they´re extremely unique and representative. There were studies in order countries, like 
the UK or even smaller European markers like Denmark and The Netherlands, but once 
researches are concentrated in one stock market, then the trends on CEO turnovers 
specifications for forced departures or external succession may have a geographical 
bias. 
A second critic is that the reviewed studies are some methodological differences 
– it is not the standard event study methodology that is in cause – on the specification of 
the analysis. Issues like the size of the company, its financial condition, governance 
policies, ownership structure, prior performance and turnover probabilities are some of 
 15 
 
the approaches used by the revised authors. In the end, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, it was possible to suggest some trends based on the findings of these authors, 
but once again, a part of these studies have different starting points which could 
influence final results. 
A third critic is that several authors really worked their data samples in order to 
have observations the cleaner possible. This is an important step for better and 
trustworthy findings.  
A fourth critic is that the mentioned studies use different event windows, which 
implies that results refer to different time intervals. Nonetheless, the important is to 
have statistical data to find stock market reaction around the CEO turnover 
announcements.  
In appendix A it is possible to find a summary table of the reviewed literature in 
this chapter 2. 
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
The event study methodology has as objective analysing the impact of certain 
and unexpected event in stock prices (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), by determining 
whether there is an abnormal stock return associated with that event.  
 
3.2. Sample  
3.2.1. Data construction 
Since there was not database available that could be useful to proceed with the 
study of CEO turnovers for the Portuguese stock market, we had no other solution than 
build one from the scratch. In order to achieve it, all we needed was to find the exact 
event days along the sample period. 
The first step was to decide about the sample period. Since all the relevant 
information we needed to construct our database is online since 2002 at CMVMs 
website, we decided for a sample period from 2002 to 2012, eleven years in total. 
The second step was to look for CEO turnovers over the sample period. We have 
researched in corporate governance reports of each listed company on each year of the 
sample period for changes in the top management position. Through it, we were able to 
find in which years and companies occurred CEO turnovers, plus the names of the 
departing CEO´s and the newly appointed ones. Please note that for companies with a 
one-tier corporate governance system, we assumed the executive president position as a 
proxy for a CEO position. Before the required sample cleaning due to confounding 
effects, we have found 58 observations for CEO turnovers from 34 companies – there 
were several companies that didn´t suffered changes in top management positions along 
the sample period. 
A third step was to find the day 0 of each observation, which we did in a double 
way. Following major studies from the USA market, whose authors look for turnover 
announcements in the Wall Street Journal to define the event day 0, our study uses a 
similar methodology, by searching in search engine Google for online news from major 
Portuguese newspapers regarding each CEO turnover we wanted to cover. For 3 
observations, we used online news from Spanish newspapers because the company in 
 17 
 
question, although listed in the Portuguese stock market, was Spanish. As a 
precautionary measure, we have complemented the online news research with each 
observation press release announcement on CMVM´s website. In the great majority of 
cases, we found the same date and hour for the online news and the press release to 
CMVM. In the few cases that the online news strongly suggests the new CEO several 
days before the press release date, we used the first ones to define the day 0 of our event 
window. After the sample was cleared, we had one single case were no online news was 
found, so we used the press release information. Finally, we define the day 0 of our 
event window as the day after of the announcement – usually the firm announcement to 
CMVM and consequently online news are the day before but after the market closing. 
In the very few cases that the announcement is during the stock market opening hours, 
and as per Cools and Van Praag (2007), that day is labeled day 0.       
After defining the day 0 for each observation of the sample, we have cleaned it 
of confounding effects. Any observation that was surrounded in its day 0 by result 
announcements, IPO´s, missing information or doubtful procedures was withdrawn 
from the sample. From the initial 58 observations, we were left with 42 CEO turnover 
announcements clear from any confounding effect. When we began the statistic tests, 
we have withdrawn three more observations due to extreme positive and/or negative 
returns over the event window. Our final sample has 39 observations, which are going 
to be worked in the next section.   
 
3.2.2. Turnover characteristics 
To answer to several research questions of this report, we needed to classify 
each announcement according to two main characteristics: the departure type and the 
succession type.  
The methodology we used to proceed with CEO turnovers classification is in 
line with the literature reviewed in chapter 2, which consists in analysing the data or 
elements available and suggest a characteristic. Since this exercise  
The press releases published at CMVM are the official vehicle a listed company 
uses to report to the market the information content of an announcement. In the great 
majority of the announcements in our sample, these official documents do not disclose 
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the motive behind the turnover, they just inform the change occurred. Accessing the 
news available in the Portuguese online press is an important procedure for a better 
assessment of each announcement, because newspapers usually provide additional 
information about an event.  
Starting by the departure type classification, we define a voluntary turnover 
according two simple criteria. The first one regards the post occupation of the departing 
CEO, where if he/she keeps a non-executive position in the BoD would be defined as a 
voluntary turnover. The second criteria regards the case where the departing CEO 
reaches the end of his mandate but decides for not re applying for the job. Information 
from newspaper was particularly helpful in this case. A few cases of jubilee were also 
considered as voluntary departures. 
It is an easing finding that forced turnovers are the turnovers that weren´t 
voluntary. For a stronger assessment, we defined forced departures when the CEO don´t 
reach the end of his mandate, don´t stay at the board with a non-executive role or the 
news in the press clearly indicates that the departure was forced. 
We also had to classify the succession type of the turnovers in internal versus 
external appointments, where we simply defined an internal succession an appointment 
of a CEO who was already in the board of directors of the company or in the executive 
committee. By assessing the yearly corporate governance reports, we could easily 
proceed with this classification. 
The classification we performed may in some cases be subjective, influenced by 
our judgment, which could mean that in one or another observation the classification 
may not represent what really happened at the time. But we believe that the 
categorization of our final sample is a good representation of the reality.  
Defining forced departure as per Cools and Van Praag: We define departures as 
forced whenever Het Financieele Dagblad states a departure to be due to: (i) conflicts 
with other management board members, for instance on strategic or management issues, 
(ii) conflicts with the supervisory board causing the supervisory board to initiate the 
executive's departure, (iii) bad performance or inadequate management, and (iv) a 
scandal, i.e. externally (often press) initiated “disgraceful” events (e.g. illegitimate 
insider trading). 
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3.2.3. Descriptive statistics 
We have found 58 CEO turnovers on companies listed in the Portuguese stock 
market over the sample period 2002-2012. After we have cleaned our sample from 
confounding effects, we were left with 39 observations to test. As we may observe from 
the following table, we have classified as forced 17 turnovers, which represents 43,59% 
of our sample. In the counterpart, we assessed as voluntary 22 turnovers, representing 
56,41%. Although we´ve verified a significant balance between the two options of 
departure, a higher number of voluntary leavings combined with the criteria we used 
(staying in the company in a non-executive role is a voluntary departure) may suggest 
that old CEOs agreed the departure if backed up by other position in the company. 
Regarding the other category of turnovers, we found 25 internal successions versus 14 
external successions.  This is, on 64,10% of the turnovers, the company had as policy to 
appoint an executive that was already in the board, what can be see as a market 
tendency. It would also suggest as a sign that a company want to give internally, to keep 
their top executives motivated as showing that an opportunity to became CEO may 
arise. 
PSI Geral – All Share only have price index from the end of 2004. So to estimate 
the market model for only one observation that I needed data previous do 2004, I used 
the PSI 20 as a proxy. 
   
3.3. Test Statistics  
The test statistics we use in this work follow the standard event study 
methodology from McWilliams and Siegel (1997), which is based in Patell’s work 
(Patell, 1976). From the literature reviewed in chapter 2, we may find several papers 
that follow this same methodology to conduct event studies. Furtado and Rozeff (1987), 
Warner et al (1988), Khanna and Poulsen (1995) and Cools and Van Praag (2007) use 
this methodology. By using this methodology, we may determine whether there is an 
"abnormal" stock price effect associated with an unanticipated event, inferring the 
significance of the event. Our events will be the 39 announcements of our final sample. 
Event studies assumptions are market efficiency, unanticipated events and non-
existence of confounding effects. 
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Each event tested has an interval of 11 days, which we call the event window. 
The event window starts five days (day -5) before the announcement day (day 0) and 
ends five days after (day +5).  The size of this event window is in line with the one from 
Setiawan (2008), which work a sample size similar to ours. 
For each firm in the final sample, we estimated the market model for the 250 
trading days before the event window. In order words, we estimated the market model 
throughout the period -255 to period -6, where day 0 is the first trading day after the 
announcement, as follow: 
 !!" =   !! +   !!!!"   +   !!"  ,    t = - 255, … , - 6,   (1) 
where, 
Rit = the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t 
Rmt = the rate of return on a market portfolio of stocks on day t 
α = the intercept term  
β = the systematic risk of stock i 
and 
εit = the error term, with E (εit) = 0   
 
The market portfolio used is the PSI 20 or the PSI All Share, depending in which 
list firm i is listed.  
From the equation above, we will derive estimations of daily abnormal returns 
(AR) for the ith firm using the following equation:  
 !"!"   =   !!"  –   (!!   –   !!!!")  ,     (2) 
 
where ai and bi are the ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates obtained from 
the regression of Rit on Rmt over an estimation period (T) preceding the event window, in 
this case -255 to -6 days from the announcement day (day 0). 
Following the Patell statistical test (Patell, 1976), we calculate standardize 
abnormal returns, obtained by dividing the abnormal return by its standard deviation: 
 !"#!"   =   !"!" !"!"  ,     (3) 
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with !"!"   =    !!   ∗    1  +   1/!  + (!!"   −   !!)!  /    (!!"!!!! −   !!)!. .  ,  (4) 
 
where !!  is the standard error from the market model as computed for firm i, Rm is the 
mean return on the market portfolio calculated during the estimation period, and T is the 
number of days in the estimation period. 
 
The standardized abnormal returns can then be cumulated over a number of 
days, k (the event window), to derive a measure of the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) for each firm: 
 !"#!   =    (  1/!!,!)      !"#!"  ,!!!!      (5) 
 
The average standardized cumulative abnormal returns across n firms (ACAR) 
over the event window can be computed as: 
 !"!#!   =   1/!   ∗   1/ (! − 2)/(! − 4) .!,!    !"#!"!!!!  ,   (6) 
 
The test statistic used to assess whether the average cumulative abnormal return 
is significantly different from zero (its expected value) is: 
 !   =   !"!#!   ∗   !!,!  ,     (7) 
 
If significant, the cumulative abnormal return is assumed to measure the average 
effect of the event on the value of the n firms. That is, the significance of the abnormal 
return allows the researcher to infer that the event had a significant impact on the values 
of the firms. 
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4. Empirical Results 
In this chapter we will analyze results for the test statistics.  
Our results are divided in four subsections. We firstly analyze the market 
reaction for all turnovers in the final sample, doesn´t matter the characteristics of the 
event. Then we analyze the results according to departure type, succession type and a 
cross sectional analysis with all mixing of departure and succession type.  
For each event study (section) we analyzed the sample that we had, plus the 
observations i that are listed in the PSI 20 index, and only for the first subsection, the 
entire final sample, we also divided the events in before Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 
and after it, as it may be defined as the major event that initiated the financial crisis of 
2008. 
In the previous chapter we saw that event time as 11 days. We tested the 
abnormal returns for the entire event time, and then also for three periods inside the 
event time. They are the – 5 to -1 days, which is useful to see if the market perceived 
the event before it´s announcement, the day 0 of the event and the period +1 to +5 to 
test the reaction afterwards.    
 
4.1. Market reaction – All sample 
 
Table 1 reports the results for abnormal stock returns for all the observations in 
the final sample. Here, segmentation of turnovers is as follows: all sample, only PSI 20 
companies and observations that occurred before and after Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy. In column number 2 we find the number of observations for each segments 
and from column 3 to 6 we find the event window duly segmented. 
From this table A, the most relevant finding is that for observations that occurred 
before Lehman Brother´s bankruptcy, the market reacts negatively at day 0 with a 
significance level of 5%. Considering that for the observations of the period post 
Lehman bankruptcy market reaction is null, the way that investors incorporate new 
information on CEO turnovers changed from one period to the other.  
For all turnovers, and without dividing the sample in two sub-periods, we find a 
trend reaction for both PSI 20 and PSI All Share companies. Although statistically 
insignificant (but almost, for a 10% significance level), we find in the days previous to 
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day 0 (-5 to -1) there´s a negative return in the stocks that is accentuated in the day of 
the announcement. After day 0, days +1 to +5 are associated with positive returns, 
which indicates a sign that the market tends to recover partially some of the value that 
was lost.  
 
Table 1 
 
 
4.2. Departure type 
Table 2 shows the average standardized cumulative abnormal returns according 
to the departure type of the CEOs turnovers of our sample. 
From all the results in this departure section, we only find one statistically 
significant reaction, a positive market reaction for forced turnovers in PSI 20 companies 
in the post-announcement period (days +1 to +5 of the event window), although with a 
10% significance level.  
Nonetheless the statistically insignificance of the remaining results, when 
comparing forced versus voluntary exit of CEOs, we find opposite reactions on the days 
before and after the announcement. Voluntary departures yield positively before day 0, 
while the forced one yields negatively. Forced departures are associated with ex-post 
positive returns (statistically insignificant for PSI All Shares, significant for PSI 20 
companies), while the turnovers identified as voluntary are linked with negative market 
Table A
 -5 to +5  -5 to -1 0  +1 to +5
All turnovers
All sample 39 -0,072 -0,08 -0,248 0,012
(-0,448) (-0,047) (-1,551) (0,076)
Only PSI 20 21 -0,102 -0,154 -0,349 0,16
(-0,466) (-0,707) (-1,599) (0,731)
Before Lehman 23 -0,058 -0,037 -0,418 0,139
(-0,276) (-0,178) (-2,007)** (0,666)
After Lehman 16 -0,092 0,221 -0,004 -0,17
(-0,368) (0,14) (-0,016) (-0,679)
Event Time (days) Obs.Turnover Events
* significance level of 10%; ** significance level of 5%; *** significance level of 1%
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) for all type of turnovers. Between brackets 
the values of Z.
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return after day 0. 
Regarding day 0 results, we find the market yielding negative returns for both 
forced and voluntary turnovers, both statistically insignificant but stronger for forced 
departures. 
Here the behavior between PSI 20 companies and PSI All-Share is similar, 
which it may suggest that we may extrapolate market reaction trends in this section. 
    
Table 2 
 
 
4.3. Succession type 
 Table 3 reports the results according to the succession type of the CEO turnovers 
of the sample. It is important to note that the appointments of CEOs in the sample tend 
to be internal (25 appointments versus 15 external appointments), which means that an 
external succession is unusual in the market. 
It is in this section that we find a higher number of statistically significant 
results. Starting our analysis by internal turnovers, we find negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for the period -5 to -1, although statistically insignificant. At day 0, the 
day of the announcement, we find a negative and statistically significant reaction from 
the market at a 10% level for PSI 20 companies (negative but insignificant for PSI All 
Shares companies). Contrasting with the previous finding on day 0´s reaction, we find 
Table B
 -5 to +5  -5 to -1 0  +1 to +5
Forced
All sample 17 -0,058 -0,27 -0,321 0,328
(-0,238) (-0,894) (-1,325) (1,352)
Only PSI 20 10 -0,088 -0,502 -0,401 0,552
(-0,277) (-1,588) (-1,269) (1,744)*
Voluntary
All sample 22 -0,019 0,229 -0,363 -0,188
(-0,090) (1,073) (-0,731) (-0,880)
Only PSI 20 11 0,013 0,23 -0,229 -0,109
(0, 42) (0,761) (-0,759) (-0,360)
Turnover Events Obs. Event Time (days) 
* significance level of 10%; ** significance level of 5%; *** significance level of 1%
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) for turnovers according to departure type. 
Between brackets the values of Z.
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positive and statistically significant market reaction for internal turnovers for the period 
comprehended between days +1 and +5. Overall, internal successions tend to create 
value over the event window, although for the period -5 to +5 the results are statistically 
insignificant.  
Turnovers from all the sample where the new CEO is appointed from outside the 
firm tend to have positive CAR before the announcement date (day 0): we find for days 
-5 to -1 a positive cumulative abnormal return of 0,47 (z =1.819), significant at a 10%  
level. Day 0 yields positively (z =0.049) but the reaction is almost null. Here, the most 
surprising finding is that after the announcement, from days +1 to +5 of the event 
window, the market reaction is highly negative. For all the sample of external 
successions, we find a negative CAR of -0,557, with a corresponding z of -2.157, which 
is statistically significant at a 5% level. In contradiction with what was observed in 
previous subsections of this chapter, the sample of PSI 20 companies present the same 
trend for the turnovers with this external succession characteristic, but with less 
strength, since no statistically significant results were found.  
     
Table 3 
 
 
4.4. Crossing characteristics 
 
Table C
 -5 to +5  -5 to -1 0  +1 to +5
Internal
All sample 25 0,105 -0,044 -0,315 0,341
(0,526) (-0,220) (-1,576) (1,705)*
Only PSI 20 11 0,188 -0,301 -0,499 0,803
(0,624) (-0,997) (-1,656)* (2,663)***
External
All sample 15 -0,055 0,47 0,013 -0,557
(-0,213) (1,819)* (0,049) (-2,157)**
Only PSI 20 10 -0,194 0,08 0,149 -0,358
(-0,613) (0,254) (0,493) (-1,188)
Turnover Events Obs. Event Time (days) 
* significance level of 10%; ** significance level of 5%; *** significance level of 1%
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) for turnovers according to succession type. 
Between brackets the values of Z.
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Table 4 summarizes the results for an analysis of a combination of turnover 
characteristics. In this paper we study two main characteristics of CEO turnovers alone: 
the departure type and the succession type. Since these two characteristics are present in 
each observation of our sample, we also study the market reaction mixing forced or 
voluntary departures with internal or external successions. 
Announcements of a forced turnover with an outside successor yields negative 
cumulative abnormal returns for the whole 11 days of the event window. If we 
breakdown the analysis, we find that this characteristics combined yield negative CARs, 
on average, from days -5 to -1, although statistically insignificant. At day 0, the ACARs 
are statistically significant at a 10% level for PSI 20 companies (ACAR of -0,771), with 
a negative Z of 1.889. For the period of days subsequent to the announcement, we find 
positive reactions for both PSI 20 and PSI All Shares companies. For the first group of 
companies, days +1 to +5 mean positive ACARs, with a statistically significant Z of 
2.209 for a 5% level. For PSI All Shares companies we find a similar trend but 
statistically insignificant. For the combination of forced turnovers with external 
successions we find no relevant results, although the evolution is alike the previous: 
negative yields first and then a price correction afterwards. 
A voluntary turnover joined with internal succession is the only combination that 
is perceived as value creation for investors for the entire event window for both PSI 20 
and PSI All Shares observations. Nonetheless, for all the tests undertaken for this 
combination, none were statistically significant. Though the positive reaction for the 
period, at day 0 investors see these turnovers as bad news, as per ACARs of -0,143 for 
PSI All Shares and -0,604 for PSI 20 companies. 
In contrary with the previous, voluntary turnovers followed by external 
successions are seen as bad news for stockholders. For turnovers with such 
characteristics, reaction at day 0 is almost null (z = -0.120 for all sample). Even though 
the days that precede the announcement are associated with positive ACARs, our results 
demonstrate that it is after the announcement that the market adjusts to the new 
information released. The statistically significant results for this combination are find in 
the days +1 to +5, which is in accordance with previous sections. This suggests a clear 
market trend to react in the following days of the announcements. We find a strong 
negative market reaction for PSI All Shares companies in this sub period. The average 
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CARs are -0,758 (z = -2.145), which is significant at a 5% level. For PSI 20 companies, 
the ACAR is -0,771 (z = -1.887), which is significant at a 10% level. 
        
    
Table 4 
 
 
Table D
 -5 to +5  -5 to -1 0  +1 to +5
Forced & Internal
All sample 11 -0,100 -0,414 -0,476 0,479
(-0,330) (-1,373) (-1,578) (1,589)
Only PSI 20 6 -0,069 -0,660 -0,771 0,902
(-0,169) (-1,616) (-1,889)* (2,209)**
Forced & External
All sample 6 0,019 -0,005 -0,038 0,05
(0,047) (-0,012) (-0,092) (0,124)
Only PSI 20 4 -0,116 -0,266 0,153 0,026
(-0,232) (-0,232) (0,306) (0,052)
Voluntary & Internal
All sample 12 0,1 0,268 -0,143 -0,055
(0,348) (0,927) (-0,495) (-0,190)
Only PSI 20 4 0,559 0,398 -0,604 0,701
(1,117) (0,796) (-1,208) (1,401)
Voluntary & External
All sample 15 -0,374 0,223 -0,042 -0,758
(-1,058) (0,630) (-0,120) (-2,145)**
Only PSI 20 10 -0,385 0,211 -0,025 -0,771
(-0,943) (0,517) (-0,062) (-1,887)*
Turnover Events Obs. Event Time (days) 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) for turnovers by combination of 
characteristics. Between brackets the values of Z.
* significance level of 10%; ** significance level of 5%; *** significance level of 1%
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5. Conclusions and further discussion 
 
In theory, board-monitoring control should be value-creating decisions so it is 
important that we examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on stockholder 
wealth.  
This study shows that investors see CEO turnover announcements as relevant 
information, since market reacts to it, but still the empirical results we find are 
inconclusive and puzzling. In contradiction with theory, we find, generally, that CEO 
turnovers value decreasing. 
At the day of the announcement, nonetheless the type of turnover, the market tends 
to react negatively. This could be read as an overreaction to new information that 
investors weren´t expecting, especially because in the “day after” the market corrects 
somehow the behavior at day 0. Since there are few activity in the Portuguese CEOs 
market, with few turnovers over the analyzed period, this overreaction suggest that 
investors in the Portuguese market take some days to read correctly the content behind 
the turnover.  
There are some interesting findings in this dissertation when analyzing CEO 
turnovers by specific characteristics of observations. For instance, we find that investors 
see internal successions as good news. This finding suggests that investors perceive 
internal succession as a continuation of the firm´s policies so that radical changes in 
strategy won´t take place. Forced turnovers and external appointments are decreasing, 
which suggests that investors react to such announcements with unpleasant surprise, 
evaluating the performance to date like it has some hidden (negative) content and not 
the capacity of a new CEO to generate value for the company.  
Overall, these findings are opposite to the great majority of previous literature. 
Although in chapter 2 we reviewed literature that as results pointing in any direction, 
literature trends points that forced departures and external successions are yielded 
positively. In this study of the Portuguese stock market, investors usually react in the 
same direction, no matter the type of turnover.  
Board monitoring, or shareholder control is more valuable for PSI20 companies 
As per our acknowledgement this is the first study of stock market reaction to CEO 
turnovers in the Portuguese context, so there are several topics that would be interesting 
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to investigate for further discussion. First of all, evaluate the firm´s prior performance to 
CEO turnover announcements would be interesting to test investors reaction for 
turnovers for companies in different performing stages. Another further discussion 
would be to attend to market performance by segmenting the observations according to 
bull and bear and bear market trends. In this study we analyzed general turnover 
reactions before and after Lehman Brother´s bankruptcy, since the date was the 
inversion point from positive performance (2002-2007) to negative performance of the 
Portuguese stock market. Anyhow, any further discussion in this topic won´t be 
supported by relevant sample sizes. 
Although we didn´t find statistically significant wealth gains (or losses) from CEO 
turnover announcements for the entire event window, we did find a few significant 
reactions over the period, which reveals that investors pay attention to some of the 
observations. For a small stock market like the Portuguese (when compared to the USA 
or the UK), the significant reactions find may also carry others unrevealed 
characteristics such the market recognition of the company or CEO. Nonetheless, our 
evidence suggests that the market reacts to CEO turnover announcements, but not in the 
way that we would expect from theory since it does not bring wealth gains for 
stockholders.  
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix A: Literature review on CEO turnovers 
 
 
EXT INT FOR VOL
Adams and Mansi (2009) USA 1973-2000 CEO 2,42% 0,15% 2,43% 0,27%
Beatty and Zajac (1987) USA 1979-1980 CEO 0,10% 0%
Cools and Van Praag (2007) NL 1991-1999 TOP 0,23%
Dahya and McConnel (2005) UK 1989-1999 CEO 0,79% 0,20%
Dahya, Lonie and Power (1998) UK 1989-1992 TOP 0,12% -0,02%
Dedman and Lin (2002) UK 1990-1995 CEO -3,40% -0,53%
Denis and Denis (1995) USA 1985-1988 TOP 1,50% 0,16%
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) USA 1975-1982 TOP 0,72% 1,05% 1,03%
Hillier and McColgan (2005) UK 1992-1998 CEO 11,82% 0,92%
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) JP 1985-1990 TOP 0,95% 0,56% 1,02% 0,40%
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) USA 1980-1990 TOP -0,26% 0%
Neumman and Voetmann (2005) USA 1994-1998 CEO 1,10% -1,00%
Reinganum (1985) USA 1978-1979 TOP 1,17% -0,13%
Setiawan (2008) ID 1992-2003 CEO 0,90% -2,30% -1,20% 0%
Shen and Canella (2003) USA 1988-1997 CEO 1,95%
Warner, Watts and Wruck (1998) USA 1963-1978 TOP 0,34% 0,14%
Weisbach (1988) USA 1977-1980 CEO 0,50% 0,20%
Worrel, Davidson and Glascock (1993) USA 1963-1987 TOP -1,17% 0,83% 0,38%
DepartureSucession
Author Market JobYears
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Appendix B: Observations collected until 30/12/2012 
 
Obs Company Stock index Old CEO New CEO Year Month Sucession Departure
1 EDP PSI 20 Francisco Fuente Sanchez João Talone 2003 Maio External Voluntary
2 BPI PSI 20 Artur S. Silva Fernando Ulrich 2003 Dezembro Internal Voluntary
3 PORTUCEL PSI 20 Jorge Armindo José Honório 2004 Junho External Forced
4 REDITUS PSI GERAL José Rato Frederico Rato 2004 May Internal Forced
5 SOARES DA COSTA PSI GERAL Laurindo Costa Fernando Barbosa 2005 Julho Internal Voluntary
6 MEDIA CAPITAL PSI GERAL Miguel Pais do Amaral Manuel Polanco 2005 Novembro External Voluntary
7 SPORTING SAD PSI GERAL António Dias da Cunha Filipe Soares Franco 2005 Outubro Internal Forced
8 EDP PSI 20 João Talone António Mexia 2006 Janeiro External Forced
9 COMPTA PSI GERAL Vitor Assunção Armindo Monteiro 2006 Março External Forced
10 PT PSI 20 Miguel Horta e Costa Henrique Granadeiro 2006 Abril Internal Forced
12 INAPA PSI GERAL Vasco Pessanha José Félix Morgado 2007 Março Internal Forced
13 SONAECOM PSI 20 Paulo Azevedo Ângelo Paupério 2007 Março External Voluntary
14 CIMPOR PSI 20 Pedro Teixeira Duarte Jorge Salavessa Moura 2009 Maio Internal Forced
15 Banco Popular PSI GERAL Francisco Dopico José Maria Aguirre 2007 Julho Internal Voluntary
16 BCP PSI 20 Paulo T. Pinto Filipe Pinhal 2007 Agosto Internal Forced
17 PT PSI 20 Henrique Granadeiro Zeinal Bava 2007 Setembro Internal Voluntary
18 PT MULTIMEDIA PSI 20 Zeinal Bava Rodrigo Costa 2007 Setembro External Voluntary
19 BCP PSI 20 Filipe Pinhal Carlos S. Ferreira 2008 Janeiro External Forced
20 MOTA ENGIL PSI 20 António Mota Jorge Coelho 2008 Abril External Voluntary
21 GLINTT PSI GERAL Pedro Rebelo Pinto Fernando Costa Freire 2008 Julho Internal Voluntary
22 Banco Popular PSI GERAL José Maria Aguire Roberto Higuera 2008 Setembro Internal Forced
24 SPORTING SAD PSI GERAL Filipe Soares Franco José Eduardo Bettencourt 2009 Junho Internal Voluntary
25 Banco Popular PSI GERAL Roberto Higuera Ángel Ron 2009 Junho Internal Voluntary
26 MARTIFER PSI GERAL Carlos Martins Jorge Martins 2009 Outubro Internal Voluntary
27 REN PSI 20 José Penedos Rui Cartaxo 2009 Novembro Internal Forced
28 CIMPOR PSI 20 Jorge Salavessa Moura Ricardo Bayão Horta 2009 Dezembro Internal Forced
29 VAA PSI GERAL Álvaro Tavares Luís Paiva 2010 Janeiro External Voluntary
30 TOYOTA CAETANO PSI GERAL Salvador Caetano José Ramos 2010 Fevereiro Internal Voluntary
31 CIMPOR PSI 20 Ricardo Bayão Horta Francisco Lacerda 2010 Março External Forced
32 JM PSI 20 Luis P. Da Silva Pedro S. Dos Santos 2010 Abril Internal Voluntary
33 SAG PSI GERAL Esmeralda Dourado João Pereira Coutinho 2010 Maio Internal Voluntary
34 BANIF PSI 20 Horácio Roque Joaquim M. Dos Santos 2010 Junho Internal Forced
35 GLINTT PSI GERAL Fernando Costa Freire Manuel Godinho 2010 Dezembro Internal Forced
36 SPORTING SAD PSI GERAL José Eduardo Bettencourt Luis Godinho Lopes 2011 Março External Forced
38 SOARES DA COSTA PSI GERAL Pedro Gonçalves António Henriques 2011 Julho Internal Voluntary
39 SONAE IND PSI 20 Carlos B. De Aguiar Rui Correia 2011 Julho Internal Voluntary
40 BCP PSI 20 Carlos S. Ferreira Nuno Amado 2012 Janeiro External Voluntary
41 BANIF PSI 20 Joaquim M. Dos Santos Jorge Tomé 2012 Fevereiro External Voluntary
42 SONAE IND PSI 20 Rui Correia Belmiro de Azevedo 2012 Março Internal Voluntary
